Genevieve M. Daniels, Genevieve M. Daniels, P.C.
800-470-8661 | E-mail Genevieve Daniels
First District Holds That Property Owner Cannot Avoid Mortgage Foreclosure Judgment Based on Forged Deed
Facts
Chiquita Mahon and Bobby Binion jointly purchased real estate property. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Mahon, 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U, ¶2. Although Binion purportedly transferred his interest in the subject property to Mahon through a 2001 warranty deed, he subsequently executed a 2006 mortgage with HSBC Bank USA (HSBC) against that same property. Id. Approximately six months later, Binion defaulted on the mortgage and HSBC filed a foreclosure complaint against him. Id. Mahon intervened, seeking to void the mortgage by claiming that she was the sole owner and that Binion did not have an interest in the property when he executed the 2006 mortgage because he had transferred his interest to Mahon in 2001. Id. HSBC amended its complaint, adding Mahon as a defendant and arguing, in the alternative, that it was entitled to an equitable lien against the property in the event the mortgage was voided. Id. Apparently, HSBC had been paying the real estate taxes and hazard insurance premiums for over ten years following Binion’s default, unjustly enriching Mahon in the process. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶2 – 4.
The central issue at trial was whether Binion signed the 2001 warranty deed.2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶6. Mahon was her only witness as Binion did not testify. Id. HSBC provided expert testimony claiming the 2001 deed was forged, and therefore the 2006 mortgage was valid. Id.
During the trial, Mahon testified that she believed that only her name had been on the title of the subject property since 2001. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶8. She also testified that she had personally observed Binion sign the 2001 warranty deed, remembered the notarization of the deed, and was familiar with Binion’s signature, as she had had a long-standing personal and professional relationship with him. Id. On cross-examination, Mahon was questioned about her prior deposition testimony in which she testified that she was not familiar with Binion’s signature and did not know whether his signature was on the 2001 deed. Id. Mahon explained this discrepancy in her testimony by claiming that because she now had had an opportunity to review the documents, she realized that she was familiar with them. Id. There were other discrepancies in her testimony relating to her relationship with Binion. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶9.
HSBC then called its expert to testify as to whether the signature on the warranty deed was Binion’s. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶11. HSBC’s expert described herself as a forensic document examiner who had testified more than 200 times, had written numerous articles, was a member of several professional organizations, and had undergone extensive professional training. Id. As for the expert’s methodology, she compared known samples of Binion’s signature with the signature on the 2001 deed. Id. After reviewing a “number of fundamental differences that exist between the questioned signature and the known signature,” including “beginning strokes, spacing, letter design, slant, connecting strokes, [and] ending strokes,” the expert concluded that Binion did not sign the 2006 warranty deed. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶12. Mahon took issue with the expert’s use of enlarged photocopies of the signature samples rather than an original sample, claiming that photocopies are not as reliable as originals, and noted the fact that there was variation among the samples that Marsh analyzed.2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶13.
Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of HSBC. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶18. In doing so, the trial court found that Mahon’s testimony was not credible because of the significant inconsistences between her testimony at trial and her prior deposition testimony. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶15. The trial court also found HSBC’s expert to be qualified and her methodology sound. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶16 – 17. Mahon filed a timely appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination regarding Mahon’s credibility and the expert’s qualifications and methodology. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶6, 19.
Appellate Court
The appellate court upheld the lower court’s decision, finding that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and affording the trial court great deference, as it was in the best position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶24. With respect to Mahon’s claim that her testimony was creditable and uncontroverted, the appellate court disagreed, noting that the record was replete with evidence of her inconsistent testimony and that she was not a disinterested witness, as her liability for damages hinged on whether the 2001 deed was valid. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶28 – 30.
Similarly, noting that the decision whether to admit an expert’s testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, the appellate court remarked that “[t]here is no predetermined formula for how an expert acquires specialized knowledge or experience and the expert can gain such through practical experience, scientific study, education, training or research.” 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶33. Practical field experience may be sufficient, and such an expert’s testimony should be admissible provided that the expert has sufficient knowledge, skill, training, or education and the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. Id. Mahon’s objections based on the expert’s field of study, her failure to train in any government or laboratory setting, and the fact that two of her certifications were from now defunct organizations were insufficient to disqualify HSBC’s expert. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶35 – 39. Indeed, the appellate court noted that Mahon failed to cite any legal authority to support her arguments. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶35.
With respect to the expert’s methodology, the appellate court stated that in Illinois, the Frye standard (i.e., the “general acceptance test”) governs the admission of expert testimony. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶41, citing, in part, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923). Under this standard, it is sufficient that the underlying method used to generate an expert opinion is reasonably relied on by experts in the field. Id.
In reviewing her methodology, the appellate court noted that the expert had reviewed several examples of Binion’s signature from deeds, mortgages, and voter registration records, among others sources, analyzing the signature on the 2001 deed side-by-side with these materials and evaluating them through a number of handwriting characteristics. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶42. Mahon objected to the expert’s use of photocopies for her evaluation, citing the American Board of Forensic Examiners’ guidance that “[p]hotocopies pose an inherent limitation that can interfere with the examination procedure.” 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶44. The appellate court countered that while “photocopies can interfere with the examination procedure,” that does not establish that they “inherently do so.” [Emphasis in original.] Id. Because Mahon failed to argue that the photocopies interfered with the examination process or explain how they interfered, she failed to counter the expert’s testimony that the photocopies were clear and very legible. Id. Moreover, the appellate court found Mahon’s objection to the expert’s enlarging the photocopies to be without merit, as the expert testified that she had based her opinions on the actual photocopies themselves and not the enlargements. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶45. Under these circumstances, the appellate court declined to call into question the expert’s use of photocopies in her analysis and called Mahon’s challenge “entirely meritless.” 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶43 – 45.
Finally, the appellate court rejected Mahon’s challenge based on the expert’s failure to collect or have access to Binion’s current writing samples that were requested for the litigation. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶43, 46. Because the record indicated that the expert analyzed more than 30 samples of Binion’s signatures over an extended period of time, including from the time the 2001 deed was executed, the appellate court agreed that she employed a sound methodology in reaching her opinion and that the trial court did not err in admitting her testimony. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶46.
For all of these reasons, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, agreeing that the evidence amply supported the trial court’s judgment, which was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2025 IL App (1st) 232462-U at ¶¶47 – 50.
For more information about real estate law, see MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: CORRESPONDING ISSUES (IICLE®, 2024). Online Library subscribers can view it for free by clicking here. If you don’t currently subscribe to the Online Library, visit www.iicle.com/subscriptions.